Constitutional analysis rejects broad role stereotypes. A public employer cannot exclude women from travel-intensive positions merely because officials assume mothers prefer to remain near home. A state cannot reserve a distinctive educational program for men based on generalized beliefs about women's abilities or preferences. In United States v. Virginia, Virginia's explanations did not justify denying women access to the educational opportunity provided by the Virginia Military Institute. Statistical generalizations about a group do not decide whether an individual is qualified.

Relevant differences can matter, but the classification must fit the government's important objective. A sex-neutral physical requirement tied to the actual tasks of a public job evaluates ability directly. An express male-female rule instead requires the government to explain why sex itself substantially relates to the objective. Current doctrine also permits sex-separated athletic teams in the circumstances addressed by West Virginia v. B. P. J., where the Court held that safety and competitive fairness justified the classifications before it. That setting-specific holding is not a license to use sex categories without analysis in unrelated programs.

Actor and source remain essential. A public university's express sex classification is government action and receives constitutional review. A covered private employer that fires a worker because she is a woman may violate Title VII even though the employer is not a state actor. Title VII's statutory rule and intermediate equal-protection scrutiny are distinct paths. For CLEP purposes, identify who acted, the line drawn, the comparison group, and the source before evaluating objective and fit.

Video lesson: Sex Discrimination: Crash Course Government and Politics #30