Great—or Connecticut—Compromise

This arrangement did more than split the difference numerically. It made two kinds of consent necessary for ordinary national legislation. A proposal must ordinarily win approval in a chamber reflecting population and in a chamber reflecting state equality. Populous states gained greater influence in the House; small states gained equal standing in the Senate. Neither principle controls Congress alone, and bicameral disagreement can block action. The compromise therefore turned a political conflict into an enduring feature of the legislative process.

The settlement also included an important institutional detail concerning revenue bills. The Constitution requires bills for raising revenue to originate in the House, the chamber closer to population, while permitting the Senate to propose or agree to amendments. This did not give the House exclusive control over taxation, but it connected initiation of revenue measures to the popularly apportioned chamber. The Senate's equal suffrage became especially secure because Article V provides that no state may be deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate without its consent.

Keep this bargain separate from the Three-Fifths Clause. The Connecticut Compromise answered whether population or states would be represented in the structure of Congress. The Three-Fifths Clause answered how a state's population would be counted for House apportionment and direct taxes when that state enslaved human beings. Both affected representation, but their moral and political character differed. A test item describing a population-based House and equal-state Senate points to Connecticut; an item describing the apportionment consequences of slavery points elsewhere.

Video lesson: Constitutional Compromises: Crash Course Government and Politics #5